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THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
CONTRACTING STATE 
ANDREAS ABEGG* 
I 
INTRODUCTION: THE ORIENTATION OF  
PRESENT-DAY DOCTRINE ON THE CONTRACTING STATE 
Globalization challenges our understanding of the state as the main source 
of legitimate law.1 This article will take this claim one step further. Today, we 
may also see the decline of the state, in its modern sense, from within. Evidence 
for this may be found in the rising importance of contracting by the 
administrative state fulfilling its duties. For example, in various countries in 
Europe, the administrative agencies make contracts with people regarding the 
conditions they must meet to obtain asylum, parole, and social welfare 
assistance.2 Furthermore, there are many types of contracts between 
administrative agencies and private companies securing public services or 
promoting public policies.3 For example, the federal administration of 
Switzerland recently hired a private company to run the electronic cadastral 
register, a task clearly once thought of as a core responsibility of the state.4 
In the law of continental Europe, the contract between the state and private 
persons—also generally known as the administrative contract—appears in two 
manifestations: as a private law contract between the administrative state and 
private persons on the one hand, and as a public law contract between the 
administrative state and private persons on the other. With this contract, either 
in the private law or the public law manifestation, the state is using the tool of 
legally stabilized cooperation to achieve its political goals. Thus, in the private 
law administrative agreement, a public element is introduced with the setting of 
a political goal, and in the administrative-law agreement, a traditional element 
of the private is introduced with the cooperation form of contract. 
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 1.  See Dan Wielsch, Relational Justice, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 191.  
 2.  Andreas Abegg, From the Social Contract to a Social Contract Law—Forms and Function of 
Administrative Contracts in a Fragmented Society, 3 ANCILLA IURIS 1, 22 (2008) (Switz.). For more 
examples, see Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen, The Contractualisation of the Citizen—On the 
Transformation of Obligation into Freedom, 10 SOZIALE SYSTEME 273, 275–79 (2004) (Switz.).  
 3.  See, e.g., Udo Di Fabio, Vertrag statt Gesetz? - Gesetzesvertretende und Gesetzesausfüllende 
Verwaltungsverträge im Natur- und Landschaftsschutz, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVBL] 
338 (1990) (Ger.); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000). 
 4.  SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC] 
[CIVIL CODE] Feb. 1, 1991, SR 210, art. 953 (Switz.); see also EGRIS—ELEKTRONISCHES 
GRUNDSTÜCK-INFORMATIONSSYSTEM, http://www.egris.info (last visited July 7, 2012).  
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From the observational perspective of a system theory based on evolutionary 
theory, what is initially evident when we consider the subject of the contract 
between the state and private persons is the juxtaposition of politics and law. In 
this juxtaposition, on the one hand we have what the political system aims to 
do—to unite the whole of society with the law and to bring about general 
prosperity. On the other hand, the aim is for the administrative state to be 
controlled by the rule of law: firstly, to ensure that planning security is a service 
provided by the law for modern society (and in particular for the economy), and 
secondly, to  legitimize the administrative state’s use of force by presenting it as 
a service provided by the law for the political system and for society in the 
wider sense. Furthermore, the contract between the state and private persons 
demonstrates a juxtaposition of law and those areas of society that, as a result of 
the contract, become linked with the political system. Normally what we have 
here would be a co-evolution between the political and the economic systems: 
instead, the need to flexibly transfer certain state functions to the economic 
sphere collides with the premise demanded by economics—that it should be 
possible, within the market environment that has been safeguarded by the state, 
to create a profit in economic projects, and to use this profit as a new basis for 
future profit-making. To put it briefly, the flexibility required in the political 
sphere for the implementation of public policies is set against the economic 
sphere’s demands for planning security.5 
According to the current literature on contracts between the state and private 
persons, the main task of legal scholars should be to “use” the legal institution 
of the contract to make the increasingly divergent interest structures of society 
useful to the administrative state, for the realization of the administrative state’s 
own program.6 But, when the administrative state resorts to contracts and the 
inevitable freedom of action and negotiation associated therewith, such increase 
of cooperation results in a crisis of legitimacy for the administrative state, which 
leaves the safe haven of traditional legitimacy mechanisms provided by 
democracy and the rule of law. According to current literature, this crisis is to 
be overcome by means of more extensive subjection to the law7 and subjection 
to basic rights.8 These two postulates are to be realized with a substantive and 
 
 5.  On this perspective, see Gunther Teubner, Vertragswelten: Das Recht in der Fragmentierung 
von Private Governance Regimes, 17 RECHTSHISTORISCHES J. 234 (1998) (Ger.). On the relationship 
between law and the administration, see generally PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: 
ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY (1969). 
 6.  See, e.g., AUGUST MÄCHLER, VERTRAG UND VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE: 
AUSGEWÄHLTE FRAGEN ZUM VERTRAGLICHEN HANDELN DER VERWALTUNG UND ZUM EINSATZ 
DES VERTRAGES IN DER VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE 618 (2005) (Switz.); FRANK KLEIN, DIE 
RECHTSFOLGEN DES FEHLERHAFTEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHEN VERTRAGS 73 (2003) (Switz.).  
 7.  See, e.g., MÄCHLER, supra note 6, at 385–86; ULRICH HÄFELIN, GEORG MÜLLER & FELIX 
UHLMANN, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT N 1069–70 (2006) (Switz.); Eberhard Schmidt-
Aßmann, Das Recht der Verwaltungsverträge zwischen gesetzlicher Bindung und administrativer 
Gestaltung, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HEINRICH WILHELM KRUSE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG (Walter 
Drenseck ed., 2001) (Ger.). Similarly for U.S. law, see Freeman, supra note 3, at 213.  
 8.  See, e.g., Isabelle Häner, Grundrechtsgeltung bei der Wahrnehmung staatlicher Aufgaben durch 
Private, 11 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS 1144 (2002) (Switz.); Markus Schefer, Grundrechtliche 
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procedural consolidation of norms based on the needs of the administrative 
state.9 This present-day orientation of doctrine can find support in a long 
tradition that has essentially sought to legitimize the new sovereign state with 
an administrative law that is steeped in academic thinking.10 
The present-day crisis of legitimacy faced by the cooperating administrative 
state, however, goes too deep for us to be able to address the problem solely 
with the safeguards provided by public law as acquired in the struggle to defend 
society against the new sovereign state, or by shifting the problems into the 
sphere of private law, as has recently become fashionable.11 This article 
discusses the legitimacy deficit of the administrative contract, including an 
examination of the paths legal theory may offer to account for both the political 
context requirements and the legitimacy requirements of the administrative 
contract. This examination covers three legitimacy mechanisms: rule of law, 
democratic, and evolutionary-reflexive theory. 
II 
THE NEED FOR NEW LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATIONS 
BETWEEN THE STATE AND PRIVATE PERSONS 
In the concept of the continental constitutional state, the legitimacy problem 
is rendered invisible by a participation process that reaches out into society, and 
is mitigated by the subjection of administrative agencies to the same law that 
has come into being in this participation process. As history shows, however, 
both the nature and intensity of the participation system and the nature and 
 
Schutzpflichten und die Auslagerung Staatlicher Aufgaben, 11 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS 1131 
(2002) (Switz.). 
 9.  Georg Müller, Zulässigkeit des Vertrages und zulässige Vertragsinhalte, in DER 
VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHE VERTRAG IN DER PRAXIS 36–37 (Isabelle Häner & Bernhard Waldmann 
eds., 2007) (Switz.); Bernhard Waldmann, Der Verwaltungsrechtliche Vertrag – eine Einführung, in DER 
VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHE VERTRAG IN DER PRAXIS, supra, at 23. For a procedural point of view, 
see MÄCHLER, supra note 6. For a German point of view, see Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 7, at 67–68. 
 10.  For a Swiss example of such academic thinking, see WALTHER BURCKHARDT, KOMMENTAR 
DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESVERFASSUNG VOM 29. MAI 1874 Art. 114 (1914); JAKOB DUBS, DAS 
ÖFFENTLICHE RECHT DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT DARGESTELLT FÜR DAS VOLK 
14, 151, 206 (1878); ALFRED KÖLZ, NEUERE SCHWEIZERISCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE: IHRE 
GRUNDLINIEN IN BUND UND KANTONEN SEIT 1848 (2004); FERDINAND ZEHENDER, DR. JAKOB 
DUBS, EIN SCHWEIZERISCHER REPUBLIKANER (1880). More skeptical was FRITZ FLEINER, 
EIDGENÖSSISCHE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 13 (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1921). For Germany, 
see Otto Mayer, Zur Lehre vom öffentlichrechtlichen Vertrage, 3 ARCHIV FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 3 
(1888); for France, see RODOLPHE DARESTE, LA JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE EN FRANCE; OU TRAITE 
DU CONTENTIEUX DE L’ADMINISTRATION (1862); EUGENE PERRIQUET, LES CONTRATS DE L’ETAT: 
TRAITE COMPRENANT NOTAMMENT LES REGLES EN MATIERE DE VENTES . . . CONCESSIONS . . . 
PENSIONS . . . RECOMPENSES NATIONALE (1884). 
 11.  On the relationship between privatization and contractualization in the 1990s, see Stephan von 
Bandemer et al., Staatsaufgaben—Von der “schleichenden Privatisierung” zum “aktivierenden Staat,” in 
DEN STAAT NEU DENKEN. REFORMPERSPEKTIVEN FÜR DIE LANDESVERWALTUNGEN (Fritz Behrens 
et al. eds., 1995) (Ger.); Gunther Teubner, Nach der Privatisierung? Diskurskonflikte im Privatrecht, 
1998 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 19 (Ger.); Gunther Teubner, After Privatization? The 
Many Autonomies of Private Law, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 393 (1998) (Eng.). 
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intensity of the legal subjection remain contingent.12 The possibility of 
consultation with those who are subject and the subjection under the law of 
those who wield power means that the threat of the application of force (which 
must always lurk behind the law) is made bearable. On the other hand the 
appearance of the unavailable is generated—that is, the law as established by 
means of instruments no longer appears as such, but on the contrary appears to 
be withdrawn from the direct legislator and generated by society, which subjects 
itself to the same law.13 From a historico-evolutionary perspective, the 
underlying unity of politics and law in the modern national state has served to 
overcome the previously unsatisfactory enforcement of the law, as well as the 
difficulty of controlling a complex society. This sentiment was expressed 
particularly powerfully in the French Revolution, and in particular with the 
separation of the administrative state and the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts;14 it is also evident in the theories of Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi 
(1720–1771).15 Once politics and law were placed on an equal footing, it became 
possible for the political sphere, for better implementation and stabilization 
over time, to clothe its communications in the form of the law whenever 
required, above all in the process of legislation and in the issuing of 
administrative dispositions, which were modelled on court judgements. 
Admittedly, with the positivization of the law, the persuasive power of politics 
(now cast into the legal mold) and the persuasive power of the law as supported 
with the state monopoly on power, were massively dependent upon legitimacy 
provided by law. In the early days of the modern state, this legitimacy was in 
accordance with the hierarchically conceived state that is responsible for 
ensuring the unity of society—sought in the sovereign. Consultation in political 
matters, through non-political rationalities such as independent courts or 
cooperations with private persons, was precisely what was to be overcome, a 
relict of the feudal state.16 
In this situation it is clear that the contract on the one hand and legitimacy 
through legislation on the other hand are incompatible in the sense that the 
 
 12.  For more details, see ANDREAS ABEGG, DIE EVOLUTION DES VERWALTUNGSVERTRAGS 
ZWISCHEN STAATSVERWALTUNG UND PRIVATEN 216, 280, 333 (2010) (Switz.). For the foundations of 
this view, see MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 125 (Tübingen J.C.B. Mohr Verlag 
1980) (1922) (Ger.). 
 13.  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG: BEITRÄGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES 
RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS (1992) (Ger.). On administrative law, see 
Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 7, at 65–67. 
 14.  ROLAND MOUSNIER, LA VENALITE DES OFFICES SOUS HENRI IV ET LOUIS XIII 325–26 
(1945); see also ROLAND MOUSNIER, LES INSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE SOUS LA MONARCHIE 
ABSOLUE 1598–1789 (1974) (Fr.); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L' ANCIEN REGIME ET LA REVOLUTION 
191–92, 202 (1856) (Fr.). For more details, see ABEGG, supra note 12, at 32–36. 
 15.  JOHANN HEINRICH GOTTLOB VON JUSTI, DIE GRUNDFESTE ZU DER MACHT UND 
GLÜCKSEELIGKEIT DER STAATEN, ODER, AUSFÜHRLICHE VORSTELLUNG DER GESAMTEN POLICEY-
WISSENSCHAFT 464–65 (1760) (Ger.); JOHANN HEINRICH GOTTLOB VON JUSTI, GRUNDSÄTZE DER 
POLIZEIWISSENSCHAFT 615–17 (1782) (Ger.).  
 16.  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 414–45 (1993) (Ger.). On the 
historical events bearing withness of transition see ABEGG, supra note 12, at 33–35. 
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contractual connection between the political and economic spheres actually 
threatens to dissolve the legitimacy mechanism of the sovereign, and 
subsequently that of the democratic constitutional state, which assumes 
sovereignty from the monarchical ruler. If the administrative state wishes to 
intervene in areas of society by means of cooperation, then the sovereignty of 
the state (that is, its claim to bring about unity and prosperity in society 
precisely by the fact that all power is monopolized in the state) is called into 
question. Admittedly, it was possible for this problem to be mitigated in the 
constitutional state, so that (1) subjection to the sovereign was consistently 
transferred to subjection to the legislation, and (2) this subjection to the 
legislation—precisely through its open textual structure—was made less 
stringent when administrative courts were able to preside over a more broadly 
interpreted subjection to the legislation.17 This would not remove, however, a 
fundamental incompatibility between cooperations involving the state and 
private persons on the one hand, and the legitimacy models of the modern state 
on the other hand: if the administrative state wishes to cooperate with private 
persons in order to fulfill its functions, or if it is obliged to do so, then it must to 
a certain extent also have the corresponding freedom to negotiate the ends and 
means of such cooperations. Here, the administrative state is at least potentially 
determining not only the path to the political goal, but is also increasingly 
determining the goal itself, with the result that the concept of “legality of the 
administrative state,” as the guarantor of social organization under the rule of 
law, and as the mediator of democratic legitimacy in the form of a sophisticated 
participation process, is called into question.18 
In light of the self-radicalizing dynamic of contracts between the state and 
private persons, and their function of case-by-case bringing together a society 
that is drifting apart, the concept of subjection to statutory law cannot on its 
own create sufficient legitimacy; therefore it is interesting to look for possible 
ways to take account of the requirements of the political context, and in 
particular, to ensure legitimacy. 
III 
RULE-OF-LAW LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS 
Advocates of rule-of-law legitimacy mechanisms are often positively 
disposed towards the self-regulation of society and not generally opposed to 
cooperation between the state and private persons. They are critical, however, 
of the blurring of the outlines of the concept of administrative law, stating that 
 
 17.  See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DEMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE 101 (1835–1840) 
(Fr.) (discussing the evolution of the Conseil d’Etat, focusing more on the control of the administration 
within the state hierarchy than on the rights of the citizens). See also Jean-Marie Auby, The Abuse of 
Power in French Administrative Law, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 549, 549–50 (1970). On the evolution of the 
doctrine of excès de pouvoir, see FRANÇOIS BURDEAU, HISTOIRE DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF: DE LA 
RÉVOLUTION AU DÉBUT DES ANNEES 1970, 83, 167–74 (1995) (Fr.); Barna Horvath, Rights of Man: 
Due Process of Law and Excès de Pouvoir, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 539 (1955). 
 18.  Schmidt-Aßmann, supra note 7, at 65–66. 
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the creation of self-regulatives and cooperations relieves the administrative 
state of its burdens, to the point of becoming a substitute for it, transferring 
responsibility for fulfillment of public purposes to private persons.19 
Consequently, advocates of rule-of-law legitimacy propose that the concept of 
administrative enforcement should be extended and that hybrid organizational 
structures should be reincorporated into administrative law as a new 
administrative reality,20 whereby the traditional transfer of legitimacy would be 
restored through the functional synthesis of public law and politics under the 
continental form of rule of law, the “Rechtsstaat.”21 
In this view, basic rights ought to apply if any form of private order becomes 
existentially dependent upon politics.22 In addition, the responsibility of the 
state as a guarantor vis-à-vis affected third parties ought not to lapse. As soon 
as the state brings public purposes into the sphere of self-regulation by using 
financial allocations or framework conditions, corresponding subjective rights 
are directed against the state, placing the state under an obligation to exert an 
influence on self-regulatives or on contracts.23 
But these proposals are based on a state-centered view of society, as if the 
state, or the political system, were still able to consider and decide how the 
whole of society is to be constituted, and as if the state could still be identified 
as such in every case. In fact, the political system has largely lost this ability in 
our polycontextural society, that is, a society producing a multitude of 
autonomous programs and semantics. The political system knows as little as the 
law does about the autonomies of other social subsystems, to say nothing of the 
way these subsystems react to agitation arising from their environment; neither 
does the political system have the resources to hold these diverse social 
subsystems together in one unit by its own power.24 And it is precisely for this 
reason that today the political system is no longer able to fulfill the great Social 
Contract by which the state is supposed to centralize all power and thereby 
bring about security and prosperity for all. So this great Social Contract is split 
up into a multitude of small contracts between the political system, which has 
not given up its claims, and society, which in spite of being split up in a 
multitude of autonomous programs and semantics is still dependent upon the 
services provided by the political system. 
 
 19.  Udo Di Fabio, Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbstregulierung 
und staatlicher Steuerung, in KONTROLLE DER AUSWÄRTIGEN GEWALT: VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER 
VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 237, 240–42 (1997) (Ger.). 
 20.  Id. at 241–42, 252. Similarly, proposing the expansion of administrative law to reincorporate 
the new emerging structure for the United States, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as 
Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 
377 (2006). 
 21.  Di Fabio, supra note 19, at 251. 
 22.  Id. at 256–67. 
 23.  Id. at 262–71, especially at 270–71. 
 24.  On this perspective, see WEBER, supra note 12, at 599–600. 
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Theories like the supervision state, according to which the political system is 
no longer the sole producer of the collective assets of society but still retains a 
kind of overall supremacy over the production of these assets,25 lead us in the 
right direction but fail to recognize the sheer radicality of the emerging 
contracting state: because of the general lack of means to harmonize the 
autonomous programs and semantics that have developed within our 
fragmented society, unity cannot (or cannot any longer) be achieved by power 
(or by religion either), but only tentatively, as an isolated and momentary unity 
of a fragmented society. 
Consequently the strategy of expanding public law and thus the political 
bias of the administrative contract to include cooperations between the state 
and private persons would be shown to be a move in the wrong direction. 
Therefore, in addition to a modified concept of basic liberties 
(“Grundrechte”) applied to public law contracts, which I will not further specify 
at this time, I will look at what democratic legitimacy mechanisms have to offer. 
IV 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS 
Jürgen Habermas, a German sociologist and a philosopher in the tradition 
of critical theory, has strongly influenced the recent discussion on democratic 
legitimacy mechanisms. Habermas essentially understands the democratic 
constitutional state as the institutionalization of processes and communication 
preconditions for discursive formation of opinion and will; these processes and 
preconditions make legitimate lawmaking possible. Because this 
institutionalization operates through the law, private autonomy is secured. And 
as a result of institutionalized opinion and will formation working together with 
informal public communication, societal integration (solidarity) is achieved. 
However (according to Habermas), the central problem of the cooperating 
administrative state is the increased detachment of instrumentalized law from 
legitimized non-disposable law, because by using the form of contract the 
administrative state evades its statutory basis as passed by the legislator.26 
Consequently there can be no return to the old concept of the constitutional 
state, for with the reflexive discourse with alternative forms of action and legal 
forms, general abstract legislation can no longer be a central component of the 
obligation and legitimacy effect of the constitutional state.27 Thus, a new form of 
 
 25.  HELMUT WILLKE, IRONIE DES STAATES: GRUNDLINIEN EINER STAATSTHEORIE 
POLYZENTRISCHER GESELLSCHAFT 335–36 (1992) (Ger.). 
 26.  HABERMAS, supra note 13.  
 27.  This argument presupposes the continental tradition of concealing the differences between law 
and statute. See Thomas Vesting, Rechtswissenschaftliche Beobachtung des Rechtssystems: 
Einheitsbildung und Differenzerzeugung, in ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT—ZUR 
TRAGFÄHIGKEIT EINES KONZEPTS (Hains-Heinrich Trute et al. eds., 2008) (Ger.).  
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constitutionality has to be sought—one that governs the disposability of 
legitimacy grounds and the nature of the way they are handled.28 
Today, according to Habermas, it is the citizen of the state that is supposed 
to enter into the legitimization process—in place of the independent market 
participant in a liberal constitutional state or the client in a social welfare 
administration. It is for the citizen to take part in political discourses in which 
the preconditions necessary for equal freedom—and thus the criteria for equal 
and unequal treatment—are formed. Consequently, administrative actions 
requiring legitimacy would have to be supplemented by justification discourses, 
in which it would admittedly not be possible for the formation of opinion and 
will to operate through the normal processes of legislation, but would acquire 
legitimacy by other means—for example through justification before a public 
justice criticism forum, which would consist of more than just legal experts and 
which could make problematic decisions of principle a subject of public debate. 
Specifically, this relates to legitimacy in the context of the weighing of collective 
assets, legitimacy in the context of the choice between competing means and 
goals, and normative assessment of individual cases, which existing general 
abstract statutory regulations have not allowed.29 
This new kind of administrative action, separated from the traditional 
democratic constitutional state, can (according to Habermas) acquire legitimacy 
in other ways. But it can do so solely because the administrative action makes 
good the present absence of normative grounds with an inner democratization 
(or, it could also be said, a democratization that is expanded to incorporate 
society). Depending on the sphere in question, this expanded democratization 
can (in addition to the protection provided by law) arise from administrative 
participation, that is, the internal institutionalization of ombudsman forums, 
procedures similar to court procedures, hearings and publications, participation 
in decisions by affected parties or their representatives, and so on. 
Consequently, the reduction of legal protection is also to be dealt with, for 
example, by the extension of the reservation of statutory powers and of the 
concept of intervention, the extension and reconfiguration of the protection of 
basic liberties (“Grundrechte”), and the expansion of collective legal protection 
forms. As in the concept of the welfare state, it is important that the individual, 
or the person to whom the administrative action is addressed, must be placed in 
such a position that he is able to expand and safeguard his interests and ensure 
that they are taken into account in decision-making processes.30 
However, caution is necessary, for the polycontextural nature of modern 
society must be taken into account. The question whether (as Teubner would 
say) the differentiation of society already contains a normative principle,31 or 
 
 28.  HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 527–29. 
 29.  Id. at 90–106, especially at 105, 527–37. 
 30.  Id. at 527–31; see also DIETER GRIMM, DIE ZUKUNFT DER VERFASSUNG 414 (1991) (Ger.). 
 31.  Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft in der 
Kollision unverträglicher Handlungslogiken (BVerfGE 89, 214 ff.), 81 KRITISCHE 
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whether the observer has to take this differentiation as a basis for his model of 
society in order to gain an adequate picture on which to base his conclusions,32 
need not detain us here. For simply because the polycontextural society is 
recognized as a society under the law, the dangers of a one-sided regulation of 
society by the political sphere, such as those that threaten to arise in the context 
of the implementation of Habermas’s proposals, are recognized. In this sense, 
therefore, any direct intervention in the complex structures that have evolved in 
unfamiliar subsystems have to be viewed with caution. In particular, the 
findings of the interventionist state, developed over a lengthy period of time, 
would have to give rise to reservations: self-organized discourses such as those 
of economics do not allow targeted control through political processes in such a 
way as to give rise to the politically envisaged effects in all cases.33 On the 
contrary, in the process of translation from one system to another, these 
political programs acquire a life of their own and can easily produce the 
opposite result of what was intended.34 
Still, we must confirm Habermas’s finding that numerous forms of 
cooperation between the state and private persons do not fulfill the 
requirements of the political system regarding legitimate regulation: for 
example, in administrative contracts, the economic system may link up with 
politics, but within the specific cooperation (insofar as it is subject to private 
law) it does not accomplish the re-entry of the political, or does so only in an 
unsatisfactory manner. How, then, can the requirements of legitimate law be 
supported, without our falling into the trap of interventionist illusions? 
V 
EVOLUTIONARY-REFLEXIVE LEGITIMACY 
The difficult question, in the language of evolutionary theory, is how the 
different social systems, supported by law, can in the context of cooperations be 
made to take account of the differentiation of their environmental systems and 
their principal requirements to reach a point of equilibrium. Or to put it in more 
concrete terms: How can the political system, on the one hand, be made to 
respect the self-organization of non-political discourses (as a re-entry of such a 
self-organization, for example that of economics into politics)—in spite of 
constantly changing political programs that have to be implemented, and in 
spite of the continuing responsibility to guarantee unity in society? And how, on 
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 34.  See, e.g., Peter Oestmann, Gesetzgeberische Eingriffe in die Privatautonomie und ihre Folgen: 
Das Beispiel der Sicherungsrechte im Mietvertrag, 86 KRITV 96 (2003) (Ger.) (discussing German 
tenancy law). 
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the other hand, can the self-organized non-political discourses, such as in 
particular the economic system, be made to consider the political requirements 
and in particular the need for politics to have legitimacy in terms of the use of 
political power (as a re-entry of politics into the rationality of self-organized 
systems)—particularly if, in the context of cooperation between the state and 
private persons, the traditional path of legislation, as Habermas himself points 
out,35 no longer leads to the desired goal and, at the same time, the law in a 
polycontextural society has neither the knowledge nor the opportunity to 
implant specific and effective regulations in the discourses involved in the 
contract? 
A procedural approach can assist us in our uncertainty concerning the 
correct law—for example, Wiethölter’s approach, which (like Habermas’s) 
promises always and repeatedly to bring about the integration of the society of 
the law through the participation of society in the “just-i-fication” (“Recht-
Fertigung”) of the law, and thereby simultaneously brings about a new kind of 
legitimacy.36 
If the task of producing (in the process of cooperations between the state 
and private persons) norms that are adequate for society and at the same time 
legitimate can no longer be solely delegated to the economic sphere (by means 
of private autonomy) or to the political sphere (by means of legislation), then 
the weight of the legitimacy mechanisms—as I have shown in my historical 
studies of the contracting state—is shifted to the courts.37 
If—jumping now to a timid normative claim derived from the democratic 
legitimacy mechanisms—it is important to promote the possibilities available to 
the parties to the contract, for engaging with each other and for giving 
consideration to the respective requirements, then we must not only turn our 
attention to the structural links (such as the contract) that make it possible for 
the parties to perceive themselves as—in the language of systems theory—the 
environment of the other systems, but also focus on the structures in which each 
party embedded in its own discourse reacts to requirements arising from its 
environment. 
In terms of doctrine, it is interesting to observe that decisions dealing with 
the contracting state often make use of regime collision rules. Such rules are 
normally worded in an open manner, so that the evolutionary dimension of the 
co-existence of regimes can be covered. Traditionally, such conflict of laws rules 
in the law of property have been designed with the compatibility of the 
economic sphere and the security of human existence in mind. But, in their 
layout they are formulated in a sufficiently open manner to be able to take on 
this compatibilization function in a very general sense. An example from Swiss 
 
 35.  HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 527–37. 
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 37.  ABEGG, supra note 12; Andreas Abegg, The Evolution of the Contracting State and its Courts, 
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09_ABEGG_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2013  12:37 AM 
No. 2 2013] THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CONTRACTING STATE 149 
law is the general group of clauses relating to good morals,38 personality rights,39 
and good faith.40 
It is interesting to observe the courts’ reasoning in cases involving a contract 
between the state and private persons concerning an issue that has not been 
foreseen by the legislator. The courts often observe that the aim of the contract 
corresponds to a reasonable and common set of values and that the rules chosen 
to achieve the aims of the contract were necessary in light of these values. This 
type of reasoning corresponds to Article 28 of the Civil Code, which gives a 
person infringing another person’s personality rights the possibility to justify his 
behavior. 
In the eyes of systems theory, precisely through the broad structure of such 
a collision rule, the intention is for a complex process of “social” legislation to 
be initiated in the interplay of law, academic discipline, and the systems 
involved in the conflict. In such “social” legislation the systems involved are 
urged to generate new variations, directed by the considerations of the courts 
and the need to justify deficits of legitimacy with regard to the interest involved. 
These new variations are then examined by academics to ensure that they are 
consistent with the current system of law. If necessary, the new variations are 
again presented to the courts for selection, and may be rejected again—a 
process that continues until a selection capable of providing stabilization has 
been found. In short, the conflict has to be referred back to the systems 
concerned—by all means with an indication of the solution to be sought and the 
corresponding conditions with regard to options. 
This is where this evolutionary-procedural theory meets the deliberative 
theory, according to which the courts assist private players to envisage 
normative goals, as the result of successful learning processes, without setting 
aside the principle of self-restriction. For private players are themselves called 
upon to find such normative goals by means of experimental forms of self-
organization. In this model, the deliberative theory sees opportunities for a 
transnational democracy at the global level, realized through private law.41 Yet 
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it remains grounded in particular in the old danger of (primarily political) 
power, and consequently, on its basis of the theory of action, it cannot fully take 
account of the numerous differentiated rationalities of society and the 
correspondingly different dangers faced by social sectors. 
With a simple “no, that is not right” and relatively vague requirements in 
terms of dogma as envisaged in the normative requirements specified above, 
therefore, a process is to be set in motion whereby, in a procedural manner, 
empirically supported solutions are sought that obey the strict normative 
requirements of the law and at the same time are recognized in those 
rationalities that have brought the conflict before the law. In particular, 
following a court decision it is principally for legal scholars and law 
practitioners to find variations on the doctrine. 
 
